Kas võlg on võõra oma

BNS kirjutab, et …

IMF ei soovi Kreeka abipaketis osaleda

WASHINGTON, 10. oktoober, BNS – Rahvusvaheline Valuutafond (IMF) ei soovi Kreeka uues abipaketis osaleda, kinnitasid kaks allikat Reutersile. /…/

IMF on juba üle aasta vaielnud uued Kreeka abipaketiga ühinemise tingimuste üle. IMF on jätkuvalt seisukohal, et abipaketis Kreekale seatud majanduslikud eesmärgid on ilma Kreeka võlakoorma kergendamiseta ebareaalsed.

Allikate andmetel on IMF tüdinenud sel teemal vaidluse jätkamisest ja peab nüüd kõnelusi oma uue järelevalve rolli üle…

Pole ju saladus, et IMFi jaoks on Troikas ja Kreeka abiprogrammis osalemine olnud üpris piinarikas, kuna nende Kreeka võla jätkusuutlikkuse analüüsid ei ole olnud kaugeltki sama optimistlikud kui Euroopa Komisjoni omad. IMFi siseauditi raport euroala riikide programmidest järeldab:

And because the European Commission negotiated on behalf of the Eurogroup, the troika arrangement potentially subjected IMF staff’s technical judgments to political pressure from an early stage.

The IMF-supported programs in Greece and Portugal incorporated overly optimistic growth projections. More realistic projections would have made clear the likely impact of fiscal consolidation on growth and debt dynamics, and allowed the authorities to prepare accordingly.

ja soovitab edaspidiseks:

Recommendation 1: The Executive Board and management should develop  procedures to minimize the room for political intervention in the IMF’s technical analysis.

Recommendation 5: The Executive Board and management should reaffirm their commitment to accountability and transparency and the role of  independent evaluation in fostering good governance.

Huvitava kokkusattumusena ilmus just täna järjekordne uuring (Saksa) võla mahakirjutamise teemal, mille lõppjäreldustest ei puudu ka tänapäeva ökonomistidele üldiselt võõras moraalne aspekt.

Economic consequences of the 1953 London Debt Agreement

In assessing the LDA, we must disentangle political motivations (in particular foreign policy) from economic goals. Even if we were to ascribe the most cynical and instrumental motivations to the LDA of 1953 (the need for a strong Germany in the context of the Cold War of the 1950s, in addition to the realisation of the errors of the Versailles Peace Conference and their subsequent effects), it is clear that this debt relief was emphatically designed to help Germany grow. It always prioritised German economic health over the repayment of debt.

This is a striking contrast with recent and current policies toward southern Eurozone countries. Ironically, Germany was the biggest European debt transgressor of the 20th century, as pointed out by both Thomas Piketty and Albrecht Ritschl (Harlan 2015,  Ritschl 2011). Germany strongly insists that Greece, Portugal or Spain pay their obligations, forgetting that Europe was built in part on absolution of debts so that new generations did not pay for the mistakes in the past. Revisiting the LDA we can see how different the policies in the Eurozone crisis have been, and also how these policies may help explain the length of the associated recessions.